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Criminal Law: 




Over the past 40 years, the United States has experienced an 
extraordinary transformation in the institutional design of its 
punishment systems.  Many states, along with the federal government, 
have shifted from indeterminate sentencing models (in which courts 
and parole boards wield principal authority) to determinate systems (in 
which legislators and sentencing commissions have principal power).  
This shift has been called one of the most important changes in federal 
judging in more than 50 years.2 
Whether the institutional transformation is a good one remains the 
source of heated debate.  But noticeably lacking from the discussion is 
any sustained effort to examine the institutional design of punishment 
from a theoretical point of view, and specifically to explore the 
underlying morality of different institutional schemes.  This chapter 
summarizes the first sustained attempt to explore the relationship 
between moral theory and institutional design in the punishment field.  
The effort must confront one immediate obstacle—a persistent lack 
of agreement over the appropriate moral theory governing punishment 
decisions.  Two moral theories dominate the field—utilitarianism and 
retribution—along with hybrid versions that meld the two.  The choice 
among these moral theories has proved endlessly controversial, and no 
accepted methodology exists to resolve the dispute. 
The controversy over moral premises need not be an insuperable 
obstacle, however.  Rather than trying to identify the “correct” moral 
principle, an alternative approach would be to assess the institutional 
ramifications of each moral theory in turn.  The result would be a 
menu of design options, each associated with a different moral 
principle.  This approach would confront retributivists and 
utilitarians, in turn, with the institutional ramifications of their 
favored moral outlook.  This chapter summarizes the first step toward 
this approach by exploring the institutional ramifications of one 
dominant principle of punishment: utilitarianism.  The hope is that the 
                                                 
 1. Summarized and excerpted from Aaron J. Rappaport, The Institutional 
Design of Punishment, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. 913 (2018). 
 2. Jose A. Cabranes, Sentencing Guidelines: A Dismal Failure, 207 N.Y. 
L.J. 2 (Feb. 11, 1992). 
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effort will inspire others to examine the institutional implications of 
other moral theories in the punishment field. 
So which institutional structure is best suited for promoting 
utilitarian goals?  Such an institution must possess two essential 
qualities: It must be committed to promoting utilitarian goals, and it 
must be capable of carrying out the relevant analysis consistently and 
competently over time.  Among sentencing institutions, which comes 
closest to satisfying both requirements? 
 
I. Commitment to Utilitarian Goals 
 
Commitment to the utilitarian enterprise is a critical requirement. 
An institution that fails to adopt the moral principle of utilitarianism, 
and thus embraces theories such as retribution, will be utility-
maximizing only by accident.  Thus, the institutional designer must 
consider whether an entity’s structure might influence its choice of 
moral goals.  This idea—that institutional structure can affect goal 
selection—might seem surprising.  But recent research in moral 
psychology identifies structural features that tend to encourage the 
adoption of a utilitarian orientation.  
 
A.  Cognitive Science and Institutional Design 
 
Much of the new research focuses on how human beings make 
moral judgments—specifically, why the very same individuals 
sometimes make judgments aligned with consequentialist theories (like 
utilitarianism) and at other times reach decisions more consistent with 
nonconsequentialist or “deontological” theories (like retributivism).  A 
common research strategy has been to pose moral dilemmas (such as 
the famous “trolley” problem) to individuals and study how the 
participants react.  These studies are supplemented by MRI tests 
applied to individuals while they make moral decisions. 
Drawing from such research, Professor Joshua Greene argues that 
human beings have two different mental processes for reasoning about 
moral matters—one more closely associated with consequentialist 
thinking; the other aligned with nonconsequentialist approaches.3  
                                                 
 3. See Joshua Greene et al., Embedding Ethical Principles in Collective 
Decision Support Systems, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTIETH AAAI 
CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 4147 (2016); Joshua Greene, 
Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality: Why Cognitive (Neuro)Science Matters for 
Ethics, 124 ETHICS 695 (2014); JOSHUA GREENE, MORAL TRIBES (2013). 
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These processes take place in different parts of the brain, suggesting 
different biological mechanisms for each. 
They also operate in very different ways.  For example, the 
nonconsequentialist process appears to require a smaller degree of 
effort and, perhaps as a result, operates at a faster speed.  That helps 
explain why individuals, when given moral dilemmas under stress or 
time constraints, tend to favor deontological decisions.  By contrast, 
utilitarian considerations become more prevalent when participants are 
given greater opportunities for reflection and deliberation. 
From these and related studies, Greene concludes that the 
deontological mechanism operates as an intuitive, fast-operating 
process, one that occurs automatically without any conscious thinking.  
By contrast, the consequentialist process is a slower, more 
methodological process requiring more effort.  This “dual-process 
theory,” as Greene calls it, rests on a wealth of supporting data; it will 
serve as our working hypothesis going forward concerning how 
individuals make moral decisions. 
The empirical research suggests that various aspects of the 
decisionmaker’s environment might influence which of the two 
cognitive processes is favored.  Three factors in particular appear to be 
significant: the emotional vibrancy of the decision; the individual’s 
scope of responsibility; and the decisionmaker’s opportunities for 
deliberation and reflection.  These factors provide a set of criteria for 
assessing which institution is most likely to adopt a utilitarian goal. 
First, the emotional vibrancy of a decision is probably the central 
factor influencing moral deliberation.  Emotions play a major role in 
deontological thinking.  Strongly held emotions of anger and disgust, 
among others, are associated with intuitive desires to punish violators 
or help victims, and thus they increase the likelihood that an individual 
will adopt nonconsequentialist ways of thinking.  By contrast, 
consequentialist thinking tends to be more deliberative, abstract, and 
cognitive.  Thus, where individuals are able to moderate their 
emotional responses and consider decisions more abstractly, utilitarian 
considerations are favored. 
These observations have implications for institutional design.  
Perhaps most notably, they suggest that, to promote utilitarian thinking, 
an institution should be designed in a way that creates some emotional 
distance from specific offenders and their concrete crimes.  The most 
feasible way to achieve that result is to ensure that an institution 
addresses a sentencing question in the abstract rather than in the context 
of a specific individual’s case.  All else being equal, entities, like juries, 
that confront defendants more directly are more likely to react in an 
intuitive, retributive manner.  Conversely, institutions that have some 
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distance from the sentencing decision, such as sentencing commissions, 
are more likely to adopt a utilitarian framework.  
A second relevant factor concerns the scope of the decisionmaker’s 
responsibilities.  According to preliminary research, individuals who 
have a society-wide perspective may be more likely to take into 
account the broader costs and benefits of a decision, while individuals 
who are narrowly focused on one individual tend to react in a more 
intuitive, moralizing way. 
These results have implications for the punishment field, as well. 
Certain sentencing institutions, such as the legislature, possess a 
system-wide perspective; their responsibility, in a sense, is for society 
at large.  Others, like judges, are principally focused on an individual 
criminal case.  The implication is that, for a utilitarian, sentencing 
authority should be given to institutional actors with the broader, 
system-wide perspective because they are more likely to adopt a 
consequentialist approach to punishment decisions. 
Finally, cognitive research suggests that the decisionmaker’s 
opportunities for reflection can affect his or her moral orientation.  
When required to make decisions under time constraints or with other 
stressors, individuals default to automatic and intuitive nonconsequentialist 
thinking.  Conversely, some evidence indicates that efforts to promote 
deliberation and increase accountability may encourage a more 
reflective approach conducive to utilitarian thinking. 
Institutions can be structured to promote a more reflective 
decisionmaking environment.  For example, establishing a multimember 
decisionmaking panel or commission can increase the likelihood that 
the members deliberate over various policy options.  Mandating a 
period of time for input from affected individuals, requiring actors to 
consider those comments, and demanding that the officials issue a 
statement of reasons for their decisions would also help.  All of  
these features should be considered because they can be helpful in 
calming the emotions of the punishment decision, thus promoting 
consequentialist thinking. 
The research into moral psychology provides a general blueprint 
for constructing an institution that will tend to encourage utilitarian 
values.  Such an institution should be responsible for promulgating 
general sentencing rules rather than for imposing punishments on 
specific individuals; should have a system-wide perspective on 
punishment decisions, including a responsibility to consider the 
interests of the community at large; and should be subject to procedures 
that encourage reflection and deliberation.  Of the five traditional 
institutions of punishment—juries, judges, legislatures, parole boards, 
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and sentencing commissions—only the Sentencing Commission 
satisfies these three requirements to any significant respect.  
 
B. Utilitarianism and Institutional Commitments 
 
Sentencing Commissions possess a structure that is particularly 
hospitable to consequentialist thinking.  The legislature, of course, 
possesses similar structural features, including the focus on general 
sentencing rules and system-wide perspectives.  Yet the legislature’s 
appeal is undercut by its political sensitivity to the passions of the 
public, which lead to emotion-driven decisionmaking.  Do sentencing 
commissions suffer from the same defect?  Some certainly do.  One of 
the central critiques of the U.S. Sentencing Commission has been that it 
is insufficiently insulated from the political branches. But not all 
commissions are vulnerable to such a critique.  Nothing makes them 
inherently political or apolitical.  Rather, the degree of political 
insulation they possess is largely dependent on each commission’s 
specific structure. 
Perhaps the most important structural feature of political influence 
concerns how commission members are appointed to or removed from 
office.  The U.S. Sentencing Commission, for example, has several 
membership rules designed to curb political influence.  These rules 
establish long terms in office, require Senate confirmation for all 
nominations, permit no more than four of the seven members to be 
drawn from the same political party, permit removal only for cause, and 
require staggered appointments to the commission (to prevent the 
appointment of all commission members during the same Presidential 
term).  All of these features give the Commission some insulation from 
political pressures.  
Another critical area of insulation concerns who can be appointed 
to a sentencing commission.  Commissioners must be appointed who 
are not overly dependent on, or subservient to, the political branches.  
Appropriately crafted membership requirements can promote that goal.  
To give one obvious approach, a commission that is comprised of life-
tenured officials would have a much greater degree of political 
insulation—comparable to that of the federal judiciary.  Thus, one 
approach to ensure a high degree of independence would be to require 
that all sentencing commission members be life-tenured judges and 
appointed to the commission for life (or at least very long terms). 
This approach, of course, would not entirely eliminate the role of 
politics in the commission’s rulemaking.  Even life-tenured judges have 
political allegiances, and they may desire higher offices within the 
judiciary or elsewhere.  As a practical matter, moreover, the sentencing 
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commission is dependent on the legislature for funding and its 
autonomy.  Thus, the commission must be wary of making decisions 
that could trigger a legislative backlash.  Nonetheless, one might hope 
that, over time, a relatively independent commission will accrue 
sufficient political capital to withstand the inevitable pressures 
generated by the political branches.  In doing so, it will be able to fulfill 
its ultimate role as a broadly independent institution within the 
sentencing system.  
In sum, the sentencing-commission model has certain appealing 
features that make it relatively well-designed to promote utilitarian 
goals.  Like the legislature, it possesses the emotional distance and 
system-wide perspective that are conducive of utilitarian goals.  In 
contrast to the legislature, though, the commission can be structured to 
reduce the influence of political pressure.  The result is an entity well-
suited for promoting utilitarian goals, or at least better suited than its 
rivals. 
 
II. The Competence of Sentencing Institutions 
 
Commitment to utilitarian goals is not alone sufficient to ensure 
that an institution achieves utilitarian objectives.  The institution must 
also be capable of carrying out the utilitarian cost-benefit analysis 
consistently and accurately over time.  Thus, the institutional designer 
must also consider the kinds of institutional skills necessary to carry 
out that analysis effectively. 
 
A. Key Criteria of Competence 
 
Three qualities will be essential—technical expertise, an expansive 
sense of empathy, and political impartiality. 
A sentencing institution must possess a degree of technical 
expertise.  Attempts to assess the public-safety benefits of a sentencing 
decision will inevitably involve complex judgments about the deterrent 
effect of punishment, the risk of recidivism, and the rehabilitative 
potential of the defendant.  Similarly, attempts to assess the public costs 
of punishment will require some understanding of government 
finances, including the financial costs associated with the courts, 
police, prison, and other entities within the criminal justice system. 
A second competence might be classified as a human, rather than 
technical, skill.  It is the ability to empathize with human beings who 
may be very different from the decisionmaker.  The utilitarian calculus, 
after all, requires consideration of the private costs of punishment, 
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which means a decisionmaker must be willing and able to take into 
account the suffering of a defendant sentenced to prison.  Empathy 
requires the decisionmaker, then, to see the essential human worth of 
every defendant, despite the offender’s possibly egregious acts. 
A sentencing institution must also be able to employ these skills 
without being unduly influenced by political pressure or public opinion.  
Given the turbulent political environment and passions surrounding 
crime and punishment today, the ability to maintain any kind of 
independence is inevitably difficult.  The unfortunate result is a 
skewing of sentencing decisions.  Political pressure can lead an 
institution to overstate public benefits or understate the private costs of 
a sentencing decision, resulting in excessive penalties.  To ensure an 
impartial assessment of the interests at stake, a sentencing institution 
must be insulated to some degree from the political passions swirling 
through the criminal-justice field. 
These three competences—technical expertise, empathy, and 
impartiality—are the essential skills of a utilitarian sentencing 
institution.  Lacking those skills, an institution’s decisions will be based 
on speculation or, worse, political influence or bias.  
 
B. Assessing the Competence of Sentencing Institutions 
 
Which of the punishment institutions have all three of these skills 
to a significant degree?  Again, only one: a well-designed sentencing 
commission. 
Sentencing commissions can possess significant technical skill in 
assessing the public-safety effects of punishment.  Commissions are 
commonly conceived as expert agencies charged with taking into 
account the latest research on punishment.  Further, sentencing 
commissions can adopt a broad, system-wide approach that encourages 
consideration of the full range of public-safety concerns.  In some 
jurisdictions, commissions are staffed with highly trained experts, 
including statisticians and other research scientists.  
The primary obstacle commissions face in assessing the public 
benefits of punishment has been the “shortfall in quality research on the 
effectiveness of criminal sanctions in reducing crime.”4  Nonetheless, 
sentencing commissions are well-positioned to make the best use of the 
available information.  And, in some jurisdictions, commissions are 
tasked with actively promoting and supporting new research initiatives. 
                                                 
 4. MODEL PENAL CODE § 6A.01 (Tentative Draft #1, 2007). 
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Turning to the public costs of crime, sentencing commissions 
appear to have comparable advantages.  An effective institution must 
account for the full range of costs incurred by the government, 
including the costs of prison, correctional personnel, and the court 
system.  An institution like the commission—with its system-wide 
perspective and with some expertise in accounting and related 
disciplines—will be able to gather and analyze these various data 
streams.  The agency is also positioned to take account of cost issues 
relating to prison capacity.  Sentencing commissions may not yet fulfill 
these tasks with complete success—anecdotal evidence suggests that 
commissions look at the cost side only occasionally—but the institution 
is the candidate with the best potential to carry out the task effectively. 
The sentencing commission’s ability to assess the private costs of 
punishment is more questionable.  Like legislatures, commissions 
operate at a distance from individual offenders, potentially leading 
agency members to treat offenders as abstractions, without the full 
appreciation for the unique self-worth of the lives at stake.  This danger 
can be mitigated somewhat by appropriately crafted membership rules.  
For example, a commission comprised of a panel of trial judges would 
be far less vulnerable to this critique.  Trial judges have extensive 
experience confronting offenders in their ordinary sentencing decisions.  
One might hope that this experience would ensure that judges 
understand that they are dealing not with abstractions, but with real 
human beings. 
The final consideration in assessing the commission’s competence 
is its ability to weigh the public and private interests in an impartial, 
unbiased way.  How does the commission fare on this metric?  Some 
say not particularly well.  Commissions have been criticized for being 
overly political.  Justice Scalia famously denounced the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission for being merely a “junior varsity Congress.”5  
Despite this critique, it is a mistake to conclude that sentencing 
commissions are inherently sensitive to political pressure.  The degree 
of independence they enjoy depends on their structure and membership. 
The U.S. Sentencing Commission already possesses several 
structural features—such as removal only for cause—that help ensure a 
degree of political insulation.  Requiring all commission members to be 
life-tenured judges would dramatically strengthen that insulation.  This 
change would not eliminate all political influence, but, over time, as the 
Commission gains legitimacy and political capital, it will have further 
leeway to act on its own judgments without interference.  
                                                 
 5. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 427 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
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This analysis suggests that a properly structured sentencing 
commission—one that is comprised of life-tenured trial judges—would 
be well-equipped to weigh the costs and benefits of punishment.  
Unlike the legislature, such a commission would neither overstate the 
public interests of punishment nor give short shrift to public or private 
costs.  Unlike the judiciary, it would not be tempted to neglect public 
interests in its focus on private ones.  Such a sentencing commission 
would represent the best option among the traditional sentencing 
institutions.  Of course, the appeal of a sentencing commission depends 
fundamentally on how it is structured.  To gain the full benefits of a 
commission, appropriate institutional safeguards must protect the 
commission from the inevitable political pressures that will be brought 




Some might disagree with some of the empirical assumptions 
made here.  Questioning those assumptions is entirely appropriate, and 
further research is unquestionably needed to ensure that the analysis is 
grounded in data rather than anecdote.  Others might disagree with the 
analysis on a more fundamental level by rejecting the moral premise of 
utilitarianism.  For them, this analysis will hopefully spur exploration 
of the institutional ramifications of their preferred moral theory.  The 
ultimate goal of this effort goes beyond specific policy prescriptions.  It 
is to promote a more transparent debate about the moral assumptions of 
institutional design, and to encourage individuals to be more reflective 
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